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A FEW THINGS YOU SHOULD KNOW ABOUT
PATERNITY TESTS (BUT WERE AFRAID TO
ASK)
Robert W. Peterson*
I. INTRODUCTION
In The Merchant of Venice, Lancelot Gobbo remarks,
"[I]t is a wise father that knows his own child."' No doubt the
Bard's treatment of this question has contributed to his time-
less appeal. Consider jealous King Leontes' pique over the
possible illegitimacy of his newborn child:
King Leontes:
This brat is none of mine;
It is the issue of Polixenes:
Hence with it! and, together with the dam,
Commit them to the fire.
Pauline:
It is yours!
and, might we lay the old proverb to your charge,
So like you, 'tis worse,-Behold, my lords
Although the print be little, the whole matter
And copy of the father,-eye, nose, lip,
The trick of his frown, his forehead, nay, the valley,
The pretty dimples of his chin and cheek; his smiles;
The very mould and frame of hand, nail, finger ... 
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1. W. Shakespeare, The Merchant of Venice, Act II, Sc. 2.
2. W. Shakespeare, The Winter's Tale, Act I, Sc. 3.
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No doubt similar scenes have played countless times since
mankind first stepped from the Garden of Eden.
Even though all babies are said to look like Winston
Churchill, comparing the child to the alleged father is still a
common forensic device.3 Fathers are not the only ones who
may not know their children. King Solomon is considered wise
for resolving the dispute between two possible mothers by or-
dering the child divided by a sword." It is doubtful that the
Commission on Judicial Performance would applaud the wis-
dom of a judge proposing his solution today. Fortunately,
blood and tissue typing, combined with modern genetics,
render the Solomonic disposition unnecessary.3
Since 1975, the federal government has required state
governments actively to pursue cases on behalf of mothers re-
ceiving Aid to Families with Dependent Children. States
have increasingly looked to blood tests to help discharge this
obligation. In 1981, California amended section 895 of the Ev-
idence Code to provide, in pertinent part, that if genetic tests
"show the probability of the alleged father's paternity, the
question, subject to the provisions of section 352, shall be sub-
mitted upon all the evidence, including evidence based upon
the tests."'7 Because of this amendment, attorneys prosecuting
3. Perhaps the most famous case using this technique is Berry v. Chaplin, 74
Cal. App. 2d 652, 169 P.2d 442 (1946), in which the court concluded that Charlie
Chaplin was the father, even though such a conclusion was excluded by blood tests.
See cases collected in Annot., 55 A.L.R. 3d 1087 (1974).
4. 1 Kings 3:16-28.
5. AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF BLOOD BANKS, PATERNITY TESTING (1978) [herein-
after cited as PATERNITY TESTING]; Ellman and Kaye, Probabilities and Proof: Can
HLA and Blood Group Testing Prove Paternity?, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1131 (1979);
Konugres, The Current Status of Paternity Testing, GENETICS & LAW 219 (A. Milun-
sky & G. Annas, eds. 1976); Sterlek & Jacobson, Paternity Testing with the Human
Leukocyte Antigen System: A Medicolegal Breakthrough, 20 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
511 (1980); Terasaki, Resolution by HLA Testing of 1000 Paternity Cases Not Ex-
cluded by ABO Testing, 16 J. FAM. L. 543 (1977-78); Valentin, Exclusions and Attri-
butions.of Paternity: Practical Experiences of Forensic Genetics and Statistics, 32
AM. J. HUMAN GENETICS 420 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Valentin Article]. But see
Jaffee, Comment on The Judicial Use of HLA Paternity Test Results and Other
Statistical Evidence: A Response to Terasaki, 17 J. FAM. L. 457 (1978-79).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 654(4) (1976); 45 C.F.R. § 232.12 (1980).
7. CAL. EvID. CODE § 895 (Supp. 1983 West (1981 Cal. Stat. ch. 266)) provides:
If the court finds that the conclusions of all the experts, as disclosed by
the evidence based upon the tests, are that the alleged father is not the
father of the child, the question of paternity shall be resolved accord-
ingly. If the experts disagree in their findings or conclusions, or if the
tests show the probability of the alleged father's paternity, the question,
668 [Vol. 22
PATERNITY TESTING
and defending paternity cases must familiarize themselves
with these tests and the probability calculations based on
them. Also, since the statute gives no guidance to courts in
exercising section 352 discretion, judges must educate them-
selves in this area.
Probability statistics on blood group testing are undoubt-
edly the greatest forensic advance in paternity cases in centu-
ries. Some of these statistics, however, can easily mislead be-
cause, like cotton candy, they appear to be more than they
are, or they are based on assumptions which are easily over-
looked. For example, the probability that a nonfather will be
excluded by a certain set of tests does not equal the
probability that the nonexcluded accused is the father.' The
probability of paternity, as reported by certain laboratories, is
based upon the important assumption that the accused had
intercourse with the mother and has at least a 50% chance of
being the father.9 Moreover, laboratories commonly report
their results in a format which makes it difficult to evaluate
the relative importance of other evidence in the case.10 It is
the purpose of this article to explain in fairly simple terms
how these tests work, and what the calculations do and do not
mean. This article also proposes a format to help unite the
statistical evidence with other, less scientific, evidence in a
case.
11
II. BACKGROUND
Geneticists now uniformly agree that, barring the ex-
tremely rare occurrence of a mutation, blood groups are inher-
subject to the provisions of Section 352, shall be submitted upon all the
evidence, including evidence based upon the tests.
See also ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-847(C) (West 1982).
Prior to this amendment, calculations of the probability of paternity based on
HLA tests had been held admissible. Cramer v. Morrison, 88 Cal. App. 3d 873, 153
Cal. Rptr. 865 (1979). See County of Fresno v. Superior Court, 92 Cal. App. 3d 133,
136-38, 154 Cal. Rptr. 660, 662-63 (1979) (citing Cramer with approval). But see
Dodd v. Henkel, 84 Cal. App. 3d 604, 148 Cal. Rptr. 780 (1978).
Prior to Cramer, blood test evidence had been admitted in criminal cases not
related to paternity. People v. Lindsey, 84 Cal. App. 3d 851, 149 Cal. Rptr. 47 (1978);
People v. Vallez, 80 Cal. App. 3d 46, 143 Cal. Rptr. 914 (1978); People v. Mummert,
57 Cal. App. 2d 849; 135 P.2d 665 (1943). See Annot., 2 A.L.R. 4th 500 (1980).
8. See infra note 42 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 68-81 and accompanying text.
11. Id.
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ited according to well established Mendelian laws.1 2 The basic
laws are (1) genes determine inherited characteristics; (2)
genes occur in pairs on chromosomes; and (3) one gene of the
pair is inherited from the father while the other is inherited
from the mother."3
Genes control blood groups and follow these Mendelian
laws. If one knows the blood group (the phenotype) of a given
mother, father, or child, it is possible to infer the genes giving
rise to that blood group (the genotype). For example, a person
who tests as AB in the ABO system has an A gene on one side
of the chromosomes matched with a B gene on the other. The
A type must have come from one parent and the B type must
have come from the other. 4
Over the past few decades it has become commonplace to
use these tests to exclude wrongly accused fathers.' 5 For ex-
ample, if an 01 mother (genotype 00) has an 0 child, it is
clear that the child must inherit one 0 from its mother. The
child must also have inherited the other 0 from its father. An
accused father who is AB cannot be the father of this child,
because his children will inherit only an A or a B.
The ABO blood typing system is complicated by the fact
that the systems are not codominant (i.e. not all genes present
will express themselves). A and B genes (which are codomi-
nant) are both expressed when present as type AB. The 0
gene, in contrast, is "silent" in respect to the other two genes.
Therefore a person who carries the genotype AO or BO will
12. See generally, R. RACE & R. SANGER, BLOOD GROUPS IN MAN, 498-99 (6th ed.
1975).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 489-99; S. SCHATKIN, DISPUTED PATERNITY PROCEEDINGS, §§ 5.03, 6.02
(4th rev. ed. 1980).
15. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 895 (West 1966 & Supp. 1982). If a child is born to a
mother cohabiting with her husband who is not impotent or sterile, then the motion
for a blood test must be made within two years of the child's birth. Otherwise, the
child is conclusively presumed to be fathered by the husband. CAL. EVID. CODE § 621
(West 1966 & Supp. 1982); In re Marriage of B., 124 Cal. App. 3d 524, 177 Cal. Rptr.
429 (1981); See Note, California's Tangled Web: Blood Tests and the Conclusive
Presumption of Legitimacy, 20 STAN. L. REV. 754 (1968).
The United States Supreme Court has held that paternal exclusions are so relia-
ble that due process is violated if the state refuses to advance the costs of the tests in
a suit brought by the state against an indigent father. Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1
(1981). California is in accord: Michael B. v. Superior Court, 86 Cal. App. 3d 1006,
150 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1978). Indigent putative fathers are also entitled to appointed
counsel. Salas v. Cortez, 24 Cal. 3d 22, 593 P.2d 226, 154 Cal. Rptr. 529 (1979).
16. In the ABO system, 0 is simply the absence of A or B.
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have the phenotype A or B. An A father and an 0 mother
could have an 0 child (genotype 00), or an A child (genotype
AO), but not a B child (genotype BB or BO) or an AB child
(genotype AB). Similarly, parents who test A and B respec-
tively could have a child who tested as 0, A, B or AB. A per-
son who tests as A could have the genotype AA or AO, and
one who tests as B could have a BB or BO pattern. There
would be no impossible mother-father-child combinations, so
the father could not be excluded.1 7
Because of the utility of blood group information in pa-
ternity cases and organ transplantation, the number of immu-
nological and biochemical genetic systems which can be tested
has increased to over 60. For example, the A group has been
divided into A, and A,,' 8 and the Rh (Rhesus) factor also con-
tains an impressive array of genetic markers. 9 The same
Mendelian laws govern all of these systems, and most systems
are independent of one another (e.g., the fact that a person
carries the genotype AB does not change the likelihood that
that person will carry another genotype or phenotype, such as
M, N, or MN). Therefore, the probability of excluding an er-
roneously accused father increases with the number and type
of tests run. A properly equipped lab may, in a case justifying
the expense, test enough systems to increase the probability
of excluding a wrongly accused father to over 99%.20
The accuracy of any exclusion or calculation based on
blood groups is no better than the accuracy of the tests. While
the tests themselves are routine, laboratories do not routinely
perform these tests. Tests and calculations should be done by
laboratories which have special competence in the area of pa-
ternity testing. In Sweden, where paternity testing has been
performed for decades, a government licensed laboratory does
all the testing. The laboratory tests approximately 50 persons
per working day, runs each test at least twice on the same
sample (either by different staff or at different times), blindly
17. Joint AMA-ABA Guidelines: Present Status of Serologic Testing in
Problems of Disputed Parentage, 10 FAM. L.Q. 247, 263-65 (1976) (hereinafter cited
as Joint Guidelines].
18. For a table showing paternal exclusions for given mother-child phenotypes
in the A,A,BO system see Joint Guidelines, supra note 17, at 264 and PATERNITY
TESTING, supra note 5, at 76-79.
19. Joint Guidelines, supra note 17, at 265-67.
20. PATERNITY TESTING, supra note 5, at 70.
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includes known blood samples from staff members in each
day's testing, and constantly monitors the exclusion of the
mother (an impossibility indicating a possible false test re-
sult). Two or more staff members check all entries and calcu-
lations. Under these carefully controlled conditions, the labo-
ratory has achieved better than 99.9% accuracy.21
Some tests may present special problems because they
have little or no clinical significance. For purposes of transfu-
sion, A, and A2 are usually not incompatible, so a normal
blood bank laboratory may only have occasion to run a hand-
ful of such tests a year. Laboratories doing paternity testing,
however, would run an A, A2 test in every case. In addition,
some of the more sophisticated tests are not easily performed,
or good antisera (chemicals used to test for specific blood
groups) are not readily available. For example, the Dombrock
system (Do), which has an 18% exclusion capability, is one for
which good reagents are not yet readily available.22 Also, not
all routine tests can be performed in every case. Haptoglobin
(Hp) is not always present in sufficient quantities for testing.
Gamma-globulin (Gm) is usually not present in sufficient
quantities until the child is one year old, and any amount pre-
sent before that time may have been passed on entirely by the
mother. 3
III. THE TESTS
The tests used normally fall into four categories: red cell
antigens, red cell enzymes, serum proteins and HLA (Human
21. Valentin Article, supra note 5, at 427. The accuracy varies only slightly
among the different blood group systems.
Similar accuracy has now been achieved by HLA testing done at the Irwin Me-
morial Blood Bank in San Francisco and at UCLA. Conference with Dr. Herbert Per-
kins (October 27, 1981). Terasaki, supra note 5, at 548; Perdue, Terasaki, Honig, &
Estrin, Reduction of Error Rates in the Microlymphocitotoxity Test, 9 TISSUE ANTI-
GENS, 259 (1977). It is fair to say that assertions of a 3% to 10% inaccuracy rate for
HLA testing made as recently as 1978 (see, e.g., PATERNITY TESTING, supra note 5, at
80-81) are now incorrect for laboratories specializing in this area.
As an indication of accuracy, Dr. Perkins' laboratory has achieved only one ma-
ternal exclusion in thousands of tests. While a maternal exclusion would ordinarily
signal a possible error, in this case it was finally established that the child, who was
then a teenager, had been switched in the hospital.
22. Interview with Dr. Jack Valentin (July 12, 1977).
23. Some of the more common tests and their pitfalls are reviewed in Joint
Guidelines, supra note 17; Konugres, supra note 5 and PATERNITY TESTING, supra
note 5.
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Leukocyte Antigens or white cell antigens). Each group is
tested differently.2 4
A. Red Cell Antigens
Antigens are the proteins and sugars present on the sur-
face of red blood cells. The genetic makeup of the cell deter-
mines the type of antigen present. Thus, if one can identify
the antigens, the genotype of the cell may be inferred. To dis-
cover the presence of antigens, the laboratory mixes the blood
with an antiserum containing known antibodies. (Antibodies
are proteins which will combine with certain antigens, but not
others.) If the antibodies combine with the antigens, the cells
clump together or agglutinate in a visible manner. If aggluti-
nation occurs, the antigen for that specific antibody is pre-
sent. If no agglutination occurs, it is absent.15
B. Red Cell Enzymes and Serum Proteins
Electrophoresis is a process which tests for genetically
controlled enzymes and proteins. The laboratory places either
the serum or the red material inside red blood cells on a spe-
cially prepared gelatinous membrane. A current is passed
through the material, causing the enzymes or proteins to mi-
grate into bands. The laboratory identifies the bands by using
dyes, and the position of the bands, when compared with a
known substance tested at the same time, identifies the par-
ticular enzyme or protein present."
These genetically transmitted characteristics are used in
paternity testing in much the same way as are the red cell
antigen tests discussed above. 7 None is as powerful as the
HLA system.
C. White Cell Antigens-HLA
For an HLA test, the laboratory first isolates white blood
cells (lymphocytes) from the blood sample. These are placed
24. A brief explanation of the tests is contained in Stroud, Bundrant, &
Galindo, Paternity Testing: A Current Approach, TRIAL, Sept. 1980, at 46 (1980).
More expansive descriptions of the tests are contained in PATERNITY TESTING, supra
note 5.
25. Stroud, Bundran, & Galindo, supra note 24, at 47.
26. Id.
27. See generally, PATERNITY TESTING, supra note 5, at 35-51.
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in the wells of a plastic tray, each of which contains a differ-
ent antiserum. When the antibodies in an antiserum combine
with the antigens in the presence of a biologic agent known as
a complement, the cell is killed and swells in size. Added
chemicals stain the dead cells so that they may be seen
through a microscope. Matching the well containing the
stained cells with the antiserum introduced into that well in-
dicates the antigen present on that cell. 28
D. Unique Factors of the HLA System
The HLA system can provide tremendous accuracy in pa-
ternity testing because each HLA type is fairly rare. The fol-
lowing explanation briefly describes the system: On the appro-
priate locus on the chromosome there is a gene which
expresses itself as an HLA type A. There are many possible A
types (e.g., Al, A2, A28, AWl9, etc.), but each individual only
has two of them (one on the chromosome inherited from the
father and one on the chromosome inherited from the
mother). Similarly, an individual has two HLA-B types. There
are many different B types (e.g., B5, B14, BW35, BW40, etc.),
and, again, an individual will have only two. The A locus on
the chromosome and the B locus are so close to one another
that the A and B genes are linked together in such a way that
99% of the time the same AB combination which the mother
or father inherited from a parent will be passed on to the
child. If a person receives A28, B5 from one parent and A2,
B8 from another parent, 99% of the time that person will pass
either A28, B5 or A2, B8 to his or her child. The HLA types
will recombine in only one percent of the cases, so that this
person could pass on A28, B8 or A2, B5.2 e
HLA is a powerful paternity testing tool because of the
large number of different A and B types which are character-
istically passed as a linked pair (called a haplotype). If we as-
sume that the frequency of finding A28 is .05 and the fre-
quency of finding B5 is likewise .05,80 then, assuming that the
A's and B's are independently distributed at random through-
28. See supra note 24.
29. Terasaki, supra note 5.
30. PATERNITY TESTING, supra note 5, at 57, gives a table containing gene fre-
quencies, as of 1978, for common HLA types. The frequency in caucasians for A28 is
.0513, and the frequency for B5 is likewise .0513. In blacks the frequencies are: A28
- .100, B5 - .0253. There can, therefore, be significant differences among races.
674 [Vol. 22
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out the population, one would expect the frequency of Al, B5
haplotypes to be .05 x .05 = .0025. Since an individual has
two haplotypes, the frequency of finding A28, B5 in an indi-
vidual would be 2 x .0025 = .005. 1' Thus, only 5 persons in a
thousand would have A28, B5. There are over twelve thou-
sand different phenotypes using the A and B locus.32 Compar-
ing this with type 0 blood (genotype 00), which occurs in
about 45% of the population, one can easily see that HLA is a
much more precise test than ABO.
Other blood types, of course, can be quite rare. Type AB
in the ABO system is found only in 3% to 5% of the popula-
tion, depending on race and geography,33 but the rarity of the
blood type also limits the utility in paternity testing. Because
it rarely occurs, seldom is it of any use. By contrast, the HLA
system gives a rare blood type in virtually every case.
HLA testing is difficult and sophisticated. Only laborato-
ries equipped and staffed to do paternity testing in the HLA
system on a regular basis should do these tests. In a recent
study of 1000 paternity cases, Dr. Paul Terasaki tested for 15
A locus and 17 B locus antigens in each individual. A total of
180 independent antisera were used to determine the HLA
profile of each individual. Since three individuals must be
tested in each case, HLA paternity testing is an area where
great care and sophistication are required.3
IV. THE CALCULATIONS
A. Calculating paternity probabilities in non-excluded men
Using statistics to prove historical facts is, like the sirens'
31. While empirical observation of haplotype frequencies shows that the fre-
quency does not always equal the product of the frequency of the specific A or B
antigens, by and large the product is fairly close to the haplotype frequency. If the
actual haplotype frequency is known, it is used in place of the calculation of the
expected haplotype frequency, because in some instances it may be significantly dif-
ferent. Conference with Dr. Herbert Perkins, Irwin Memorial Blood Bank, San Fran-
cisco, Cal. (October 27, 1981).
32. PATERNITY TESTING supra note 5, at 80.
33. A study of the Uaupes tribe of the Amazons found the A and B alleles, but
no tribe member among the 131 tested was type AB. Although no AB type has been
found among the Uaupes, calculations show that, theoretically, there should be one
AB person per 11,442 Uaupes Indians. Letter from Dr. Jack Valentin, May 5, 1982
- (on file with the Santa Clara Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Valentin Letter].
34. Terasaki, supra note 5, at 546-48.
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song, both alluring and dangerous. It is especially alluring
when the burden of proof itself is cast in statistical
terms-preponderance of the evidence (more-likely-than-not)
or the somewhat vague "beyond a reasonable doubt and to a
moral certainty" standard. There is a need for statistics, how-
ever, when the historical fact to be proven cannot be verified
by independent, credible witnesses."5
The California Supreme Court's famous opinion, People
v. Collins," highlighted the dangers of using statistics. Al-
though the court did not suggest any incompatibility between
mathematics and the trial process, the court counselled cau-
tion: "Mathematics, a veritable sorcerer in our computerized
society, while assisting the trier of fact in the search for truth,
must not cast a spell over him. ' ' s9
The use of statistics in paternity cases presents a number
of interrelated concerns: (1) Statistics can be very helpful in
minimizing error, but they are misleading if manipulated or
misunderstood; (2) we are wedded to jury trial, but we are
concerned about the jury's ability to cope with sophisticated
mathematics; (3) we would prefer to know the "facts" in an
individual case, but we recognize that inevitably our beliefs
about those facts are either covertly or overtly based on "the
odds"; (4) we prefer the ritual of the adversary system, but we
also recognize the value of the scientific method and the in-
herent incompatibility of the two; (5) we are uncomfortably
aware that doing "justice" and finding "guilt" are not necessa-
rily congruent. Certainly, before plunging ahead with pater-
35. In paternity cases "[t]here are seldom accurate or reliable eyewitnesses
since the sexual activities usually take place in intimate and private surroundings,
and the self-serving testimony of a party is of questionable reliability." Larson, Blood
Test Exclusion Procedure in Paternity Litigation: The Uniform Acts and Beyond,
13 J. FAM. L. 713, 713 (1973-74).
Indigent mothers may feel coerced into providing the name of a potential father
in order to receive Aid to Families with Dependent Children. See CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE § 11477(b) (Deering 1979).
36. 68 Cal. 2d 319, 438 P.2d 33, 66 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1968). See also Miller v.
State, 240 Ark. 340, 399 S.W.2d 268 (1966); State v. Sneed, 76 N.M. 349, 414 P.2d 858
(1966); People v. Risley, 214 N.Y. 75, 108 N.E. 200 (1915).
37. 68 Cal. 2d at 320, 438 P.2d at 33, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 497. See United States v.
Massey, 594 F.2d 676 (8th Cir. 1979) (misuse of probabilities based on hair samples);
State v. Carlson, 267 N.W.2d 170 (Minn. 1978) (similar misuse of probabilities in
connection with hair samples); Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in
the Legal Process, 84 HARv. L. Rzv. 1329 (1971). But see State v. Rolls, 389 A.2d 824
(Maine 1978); People v. Trujillo, 32 Cal. 2d 105, 194 P.2d 681, cert. denied 335 U.S.
887 (1948); People v. Houser, 85 Cal. App. 2d 686, 193 P.2d 937 (1948).
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nity statistics, judges and attorneys should first strap them-
selves to the mast and learn what the statistics mean, what
they do not mean, and how they are calculated.
B. The Probability of Exclusion
One misleading statistic which must be put in proper
perspective is the "probability of exclusion." Calculations
show that a certain test or series of tests should exclude a cer-
tain percentage of wrongly accused fathers. If, for example,
one tests only the ABO system, the tests should exclude
13.42% of wrongly accused caucasian fathers. 38  The
Phosphoglucomutase (PGM) system (including subtypes) will
exclude 25% of nonfathers39 Since these blood groups are sta-
tistically independent (the existence of an ABO factor does
38. Joint Guidelines, supra note 17, at 257.
39. Information sheet, Serological Research Institute, Emeryville, California (on
file with the Santa Clara Law Review). The institute lists the following probabilities
of exclusion for falsely accused caucasian men:
ANTIGENS: ABO 13.42%
MNSs 30.95%
RHESUS 27.46%
Combined Antigens 56.63%
ENZYMES: GLO I 18.15%
EsD 9.13%
PGM 25.00% (includes subtyping)
ADA 4.52%
EAP 23.23%
AK 4.28%
GPT 18.75%
Combined Enzymes 68.4%
Combined Antigens and Enzymes 86.3%
SERUM PROTEINS:
Gc 16.61%
Hp 18.34%
C 3 15.23%
GBG 14.43%
alphaAG 17.73%
Combined Serum Proteins 59.4%
Combined Antigens, Enzymes and Serum
Proteins 94.4%
TISSUE TYPING: HLA 90% (approx.)
Combined Antigens, Enzymes, Serum
Proteins and HLA 99.44%
The probability of exclusion will also vary because of the number of subgroups tested
within a particular group. The difference may be illustrated by assuming these labo-
ratories which all test the ABO, MNSs and Rh systems.
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not affect the existence of any PGM factor), the combined
probability of exclusion, when both systems are tested, is
35.07% .40 As each new system is tested, the probability of ex-
clusion becomes higher. There is a point of diminishing re-
turns because each new system, although fairly effective
standing alone, only increases the overall probability of exclu-
sion by a few percentage points.41
The probability of exclusion of a particular system or set
of systems is a useful guide for determining how many differ-
ent tests to run and at what point it is no longer cost effective
to pay for further tests. If used as evidence of paternity
against a nonexcluded man, however, it can be misleading.
The probability that a nonfather will be excluded by a set of
tests is not the same as the probability that the nonexcluded
man is the father. While it is true that the higher the
probability of exclusion, the higher the probability that the
nonexcluded man is the father, "there is no direct relationship
between the probability of exclusion and the likelihood of pa-
ternity. Likelihood of paternity cannot be extrapolated from
the probability of exclusion. ' '42 Scientific literature documents
the incorrectness of equating the probability of exclusion with
the probability of paternity. s In 1977 Hummel, one of the pi-
Probability of
Laboratory ABO MNSs Rh Exclusion
#1 A,B,O M,N D .33
#2 A.,A,,B,O M,N,S D,C,E,c .547
#3 AI,As,B,O M,N,S,s D,C,CW,c,E,e .614
PATERNITY TESTING, supra note 5, at 82.
40. This can easily be shown as follows: of 100 nonfathers, the ABO System will
exclude 13.42. This leaves 86.58 nonfathers who have not been excluded. Of these
86.58 the PGM System will exclude 21.65 (25% of 86.58). The total excluded is 35.07
out of 100 (13.42 by the ABO System plus 21.65 by the PGM System), hence a
probability of exclusion of 35.07%.
The formula for calculating the probability of exclusion (PE) for n systems is: PE
= 1-(1-P,)(1-Ps)(1-P) . . .(1-Pn) where P is the probability of exclusion for each
system (e.g., P for ABO - .1342; P for PGM- .25, etc.). PATERNITY TESTING, supra
note 5, at 82.
41. See Chakraborty, Shaw, & Schull, Exclusion of Paternity: The Current
State of the Art, 26 Am. J. oF HUM. G.NETncs 477, 478-79 (1974).
42. Stroud, Bundrant, & Galindo, supra note 24, at 47.
43. It is tempting to think of the complement of the probability of exclu-
sion (the probability of nonexclusion) as being synonymous with the
probability of paternity. A moment's reflection will dispel this notion.
The probability of exclusion depends upon the genetic structure of a
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oneers in paternity testing, documented 13 actual cases from
his own experience in which the probability of exclusion
ranged from 80% to 96%, yet the probability of paternity
ranged between 4.4% and 44%. 44 Itis quite easy to posit fam-
ilies with common blood groups where the probability of ex-
clusion is below 50%, yet the probability of paternity is over
99%.45
The probability of exclusion can be misleading for an-
other reason. Generally a particular test carries a certain
probability of exclusion, but the more correct probability of
exclusion should be the probability given the mother-child
combination in the specific case. For example, the basic Kell
blood group system has a low probability of exclusion, only
about 3.4% ,4" but if the child is negative, or the child and
mother are positive, the probability of exclusion with the Kell
system is zero. If, however, the mother is negative and the
population, whereas the probability of paternity is in reality a measure
of our information with regard to a specific mother-child-putative father
trio. Gene frequency data can enter into the calculation of both of these
probabilities, but the nature of the computations are [sic] quite
different.
Chakraborty, Shaw, & Schull, supra note 33, at 484.
44. K. Hummel, 7 INT. TAG. GESELLSCH FORENS BLUTGRUPPENKUNDE 511, 525-26
(1977) (on file with the Santa Clara Law Review).
45. The following is an example supplied by Dr. Valentin:
Child Mother Father
A, A, A,
MNss MNSs Mss
CcDee CcDEe cde
K- K- K-
Fy(a-) Fy(a-) Fy(a-)
PGM: 1-1 1-1 1-1
EAP: BA AA BB
ADA: 1-1 1-1 1-1
Hp: 2-2 2-2 2-2GC: 1-1 1-1 1-1
Ag: x- x- x-
The probability of exclusion using these specific mother-child-alleged father combina-
tions is only 47%, yet the paternity index of the alleged father is 365.4 (for a discus-
sion of the paternity index, see infra notes 56-57 and accompanying text), and his
probability of paternity is 99.73%. Valentin Letter, supra note 33.
46. An exclusion occurs if both the mother and accused man lack this factor,
but the child is Kell positive. The theoretical exclusion capability of the system is
calculated as follows: PE = .92 (probability of mother being negative) x .92
(probability of the father being negative) x .04 (probability of a sperm being positive)
= .034. Valentin Letter, supra note 33.
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child is positive, the probability of exclusion is 93 %.4
The probability of exclusion is, in a strict sense, relevant
to the issue of paternity. It tells the trier of fact that the al-
leged father falls within the 1 to 10 percent (depending upon
the number of tests) of the male population who could have
fathered the child. Unfortunately, it does nothing to distin-
guish the true father from the perhaps millions of men who
fall into this group. In addition, the probability of exclusion
looks seductively like the probability of paternity so that
there is patent potential to prejudice and mislead the fact-
finder. There is also no straightforward way to integrate the
probability of exclusion with the other evidence in the case,
thus leaving the fact-finder to guess at its significance. It may
be for these reasons that the 1981 amendments to section 895
of the Evidence Code did not provide for the admissibility of
the probability of exclusion.48
Even if the probability of exclusion were considered rele-
vant under traditional evidence standards, the potential for
confusing and misleading the fact-finder is so great that the
court should exclude it under its general power to exclude evi-
dence which creates a substantial danger of prejudice, of con-
fusing the issues, or misleading the fact-finder.4 This is espe-
cially true because there is no need for admitting the
probability of exclusion in light of the current ability to calcu-
late the more relevant and useful probability of paternity. If,
however, the probability of exclusion were considered relevant
enough to be admissible, the court should admit only the
probability of exclusion based on the mother-child combina-
47. Id.
48. By implication, the 1981 amendments to § 895 of the Evidence Code do not
authorize admission of the probability of exclusion. The section only authorizes ad-
mission if tests "show the probability of the alleged father's paternity." The
probability of exclusion does not "show the probability of the alleged father's pater-
nity." See supra note 41 and accompanying text. Moreover, the legislative history
shows that the question of the admissibility of the probability of exclusion was before
the Assembly Judiciary Committee from whence the bill originated, and the bill was
not amended to authorize admissibility. The Bill Digest prepared for the Assembly
Committee on the Judiciary by the Committee's counsel, posed the following ques-
tion: "Given the statistical nature of blood test evidence, should AB 123 require that
both probability of exclusion and probability of inclusion be given to the trier of
fact?"
49. CAL. EVID. CODE § 352 (West 1966) (specifically incorporated by reference
into new CAL. EvID. CODE § 895. See supra note 7). The Federal Rules of Evidence
grant similar discretion to the judge. FED. R. EvID. 403.
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tion in the case rather than the same probability based on a
hypothetically random mother-child combination.
C. Calculating the Probability of Paternity
Fr. Bayes, an 18th century monk, derived a formula
which tells a rational decision maker how newly discovered
evidence should change a prior probability that a hypothesis
is true. 0 The formula is a mathematical way of expressing the
intuitively obvious. If King Leontes5" had been persuaded
that his queen's conduct with Polixenes created a 50%
probability (or the odds were 1-to-i) that Polixenes had fa-
thered the child, Leontes would have modified his opinion in
favor of his own paternity if the child indeed had received Le-
ontes' "eye, nose, lip." Similarly, he would have modified his
opinion in favor of Polixenes' paternity if the child's physical
features had favored Polixenes.
If Fr. Bayes had been in Leontes' court, he would have
told the King that the proper formula to calculate the odds
that the King was the father, given the new physical evidence
is:
P (ElF) 0 (F).52
O(FIE) =__ _ _ _P (El not-F)
This means that the odds that Leontes was the father, given
the new evidence, O(FIE), is equal to the probability of the
existence of the evidence given that he was the father, P(E IF)
divided by the probability of the existence of the evidence
given that he was not the father, P(Elnot-F), multiplied by
the prior odds that he was the father.
If it could be said that the observed features would re-
semble Leontes in 10 out of 100 cases if he were the father,
but in only 1 out of 100 cases if Polixenes were the father,
then the calculation would be as follows:
50. Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Factfinding Process, 20 STAN. L. REv.
1065, 1083-84 (1968).
51. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
52. The theorem is derived in Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75 MICH. L. REv.
1021, 1022-23 (1977).
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(FIE) x10 - 10. The new odds would be
ten-to-one (10:1) that Leontes was the father. Stated another
way, in 10 out of 11 cases, where these facts were observed
and the prior odds were 1:1, Leontes would be the father.
The odds may be changed into a probability by dividing
all correct choices by the sum of all possible choices. In this
case ten out of eleven choices are correct, so the probability of
paternity is 10 =
While there is no dispute over the mathematical correct-
ness of Bayes' Theorem, the difficulties in mathematically ex-
pressing the prior odds and the two probabilities in the ratio
limit its use as a forensic device."' In 1938, however, Essen-
Mdller published an article suggesting that the theorem could
be used to calculate paternity probabilities." Since gene fre-
quencies were being discovered, and the presence of one gene
was statistically independent of the presence of another, the
Mendelian laws of heredity could be used to calculate the
probability ratio
53. Odds may always be changed into probabilities by dividing the numerator
of the odds by the sum of the numerator and the denominator. If the odds are a:b,
then the probability is a
a+b
54. Whether or not Bayes' Theorem should be used by juries and judges to as-
sist in legal fact-finding is warmly debated. For criticisms of the practice see L. Co-
HEN, THE PROBABLE AND THE PROVABLE 79-120 (1977); Brilmayer & Kornhauser, Re-
view: Quantitative Methods and Legal Decisions, 46 U. CHi. L. REV. 116, 137-46
(1978); Callen, Notes on a Grand Illusion: Some Limits on the Use of Bayesian The-
ory in Evidence Law, 57 IND. L. J. 1 (1982). Supporters of the use of Bayes' Theorem
include Ellman and Kaye, supra note 5, at 1147-58; Fairley, Probabilistic Analysis of
Identification Evidence, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 493 (1973); Finkelstein and Fairley, A
Bayesian Approach to Identification Evidence, 83 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1970); Kaye,
The Laws of Probability and the Law of the Land, 47 U. Cm. L. REV. 34 (1979).
Bayes' Theorem may also be useful as a device to explain or derive other legal rules.
Kaplan, supra note 50, Kornstein, A Bayesian Model of Harmless Error, 5 J. LEGAL
STUD. 121 (1976); Lempert, supra note 52.
Whatever the merits of either side of this debate may be, in light of the recent
amendment of CAL. EVID. CODE § 895 (supra note 7), the use of Bayes' Theorem in
paternity trials seems inevitable in California.
55. Essen-M611er, Beweishraft der Ahnlichkeit im Vatershaftsnachweis; The-
oretische Grundlagen, 68 MIr ANTHRoP GES 368 (1938); see Terasaki, supra note 5,
at 544 n.8.
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P (ElF)
P (E Inot-F)
where E is the blood group evidence and F is the fact of pa-
ternity. If the prior odds of paternity are assumed to be 1:1
(probability = .50), then the probability ratio becomes the
new odds that the accused man is the father. In other words,
the odds that the accused is the father compared to a random
man, equal the probability that if the accused is the true, bio-
logical father, he would have passed on the genes which, from
the mother's and child's blood types we know must have come
from the true father, P(E IF), divided by the probability that
in a mating between a random man and the mother, the ran-
dom man would have passed on those same genes, P(E I not-
F). The ratio
P (ElF)
P (E I not-F)
is sometimes referred to as the paternity index (PI) of the
accused.56
The index may be a number ranging anywhere from 0 to,
theoretically, infinity. Studies in paternity cases show that the
most frequently encountered indices for nonexcluded men in
paternity cases range between 19 and 100.57 If the accused's
index is 19, the odds of the accused's paternity as compared
to an equally likely random man are 19:1. The probability of
his paternity is:
19 - + 1919 +-=-95%.
19 + 1 20
It is not at all uncommon for nonexcluded men to receive in-
dices in the hundreds, or occasionally even the thousands.
56. PATERNITY TESTING, supra note 5, at 83-88. An alternative statement of the
rule found in the scientific literature is
(PI) = frequency of accused man's phenotype among
fathers in the current mother-child combination
frequency of accused man's phenotype
among nonfathers
Valentin Article, supra note 5, at 424. I find the statement of the rule in the text,
however, intuitively easier to grasp.
57. Based only on HLA tests, the current arithmetical mean for nonexcluded
men at the Irwin Memorial Blood Bank in San Francisco is 28. Interview with Dr.
Herbert A. Perkins (October 27, 1981). An index of 28 yields a probability of 96.55.%
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D. Understanding the Index
In a paternity trial, a fact-finder is naturally tempted to
seize upon statistical figures, like the paternity index or the
probability of paternity, as lifelines of objective truth in a sea
of prevarication. "Soft" evidence involving difficult questions
of credibility and other circumstantial matters may be sub-
merged or lost because it appears unnecessary to resolve the
questions in light of the hard, scientific, mathematical proof."
Under these circumstances it is absolutely essential that the
significance of the mathematical proof be clearly understood
by both counsel and the fact-finder.
The paternity index, and the probability based upon it,
can be easily misused. Returning to the example of the man
with a paternity index of 19 (probability of paternity = 95%),
it is clear that in a large population many men will have a
phenotype compatible with fathering the child. If only one
man in a thousand were to have the proper phenotype, there
would be 1,000 men who could have fathered the child in an
urban population containing only one million men. Bayes'
Theorem cannot tell us which of these 1,000 men is the father.
The most that the blood group evidence can tell us is that,
assuming paternity is limited to the men in this city and the
defendant is one of them, his probability of paternity is only
one in a thousand, or .1%.
The reason for this apparent discrepancy between the rel-
ative probability of 95% and the actual probability of .1% is
clear if we again consider Bayes' Theorem. The Theorem only
tells us how to modify the prior odds of paternity in light of
the new blood test evidence. The Theorem can do nothing to
tell us what those prior odds are. Without the prior odds as a
multiplier, Bayes' Theorem is virtually useless.
The paternity index merely represents the relative likeli-
hood that a man with the phenotype of the accused father
would contribute the required genes compared with the likeli-
hood that a random man of the same ethnic group would do
so. In order to convert this figure into the actual probability of
58. See United States v. Massey, 594 F.2d 676, 681 (8th Cir. 1979); United
States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1976); People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24,
31-32, 549 P.2d 1240, 1245, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144, 149 (1976); People v. Nichols, 341
Mich. 311, 331-32, 67 N.W.2d 230, 232 (1954); State v. Carlsen, 267 N.W.2d 170, 176
(Minn. 1978).
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paternity, we must also know the probability that the accused
father had intercourse at the right time, and the probability
that a random man did likewise. If the accused had no inter-
course, then, regardless of his index, his probability of pater-
nity is zero. If the accused is the only man to have had inter-
course then, regardless of his index, his probability of
paternity is 100%. The paternity index equals the odds of pa-
ternity only if it is assumed that the prior odds of paternity
are 1:1 (or the accused is already 50% likely to be the father).
In other words, before the paternity index accurately repre-
sents the odds of paternity, one must assume that the defen-
dant had intercourse with the mother and that a random man
(whom we shall call Mr. X) also had intercourse with her.59 In
addition, the calculation assumes that both had intercourse at
a time, and under circumstances, in terms of timing, fertility,
frequency of coition, and use of birth control, making them
both equally likely to have fathered the child. If these as-
sumptions are true, then, and only then, does Bayes' Theorem
accurately reflect the odds that the accused is the father.60
Since there is no way to calculate the prior odds of pater-
nity, they must be inferred from the "soft" evidence-the tes-
timony of witnesses, circumstantial evidence, admissions and
all of the other evidence which the fact-finder may prefer to
ignore in favor of the "scientific proof." Until the fact-finder,
disregarding the paternity index, is persuaded that the above
assumptions are true, use of Bayes' Theorem will yield a false
result.
Time and again courts,s' commentators," and possibly
59. On this basis, one may quibble about whether CAL. Evm. CODE § 895 autho-
rizes the admissibility of this calculation. This calculation does not "show the
probability of the alleged father's paternity" (supra note 7). It is only accurate if the
assumption that the accused is already 50% likely to be the father is also accurate.
Since the burden of proof in civil cases is only a preponderance of the evidence
(50+ %), the calculation is accurate only if most of the defendant's case is assumed to
be invalid. Given the magnitude of this assumption, it is difficult to see how this
calculation shows the probability of the alleged father's paternity.
Nevertheless, given the legislative history and case law background of CAL. EVW.
CODE § 895, it seems clear that this is the sort of calculation the legislature had in
mind. See supra notes 7 & 48.
60. PATERNITY TESTING, supra note 5, at 86-88. Valentin Article, supra note 5,
at 423-24.
61. See, e.g., Cramer v. Morrison, 88 Cal. App. 3d 873, 153 Cal. Rptr. 865
(1979); Phillips v. Jackson, 615 P.2d 1228 (Utah 1980) (probability of paternity ex-
cluded because insufficient foundation that tests generally accepted in scientific com-
munity). The United States Supreme Court recently noted the continued importance
1982]
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even experts" have disregarded the importance of the soft ev-
idence and jumped hastily to the conclusion that the pater-
nity index represents the actual odds of paternity. As a practi-
cal matter it may well be that justice is usually done because
the soft evidence would justify the conclusion that the above
assumptions are satisfied. The danger is that the habit of in-
correctly applying these statistics will mesmerize fact-finders
to such an extent that the statistics will be improperly used in
cases where the soft evidence is truly weak.
The coexistence of soft evidence and mathematical statis-
tics presents the knotty problem of melding the two. Theoret-
ically, it should be an extraordinarily rare case in which the
fact-finder believes that the probability of the accused's pater-
nity is exactly 50%, yet the calculations are correct only when
that assumption is made. Consequently, in the vast majority
of cases the fact-finder is left in the unsatisfactory position of
either misusing or disregarding the statistics. Paternity statis-
tics, however, can be presented in a way which makes it fairly
easy for the fact-finder either to incorporate various degrees
of persuasion into the calculations or to assess the importance
of discrepancies or doubts left by the soft evidence.
It can be mathematically shown that the index of a ran-
dom man is one."" Since one random man is equally as likely
as another random man to have fathered the child, this con-
clusion is also intuitively clear. It can also be shown that if
more than one man is possibly the father, and if each man is
equally as likely to have fathered the child as any other, then
the probability that any one of the men is the father is equal
to his paternity index divided by the sum of the indices of all
of the possible fathers." If PId is the index of the defendant
of the "soft" evidence in paternity cases involving calculations based on blood group
evidence. Mills v. Habluetzel, 102 S. Ct. 1549 (1982).
62. Trueblood, Paternity Blood Testing, Prosecutor's Brief (June-July 1980) at
8; Joint Guidelines, supra note 17, at 278 (suggesting that the probability that a
random sperm would contain the paternal haplotype equals the probability that the
accused man is wrongly identified); SCHATKIN, supra note 14, at 66.
63. See the report of the expert witness' testimony in Phillips v. Jackson, 615
P.2d 1228 (Utah 1980); Konugres, supra note 5, at 220 ("[Tjhe accurate distinction
between human beings on the basis of blood groups has become almost a surety and
at present is only surpassed by finger printing."); Joint Guidelines, supra note 17, at
278.
64. Valentin Article, supra note 5, at 424.
65. Id. at 429. A variation on this formula is also used in Europe and the United
States. The probability of paternity is expressed as
[Vol. 22686
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and
XPIn
1-n
is the sum of the indices of the other n men, then the
probability of the defendant's paternity is
P Id
PId + I PIn
1-n
Since all untested random men have an index of one, the fol-
lowing formula applies whenever the defendant was actually
tested and the other men are unknown pl d
PId + n
If we assume a defendant with an index of 19, then in a
"one man case"(a case where we assume that there is only one
Mr. X equally likely to be the father) the probability of pater-
nity is 19 19
- 95%.
19 + 1 20
If the case involves relative promiscuity, we may infer three
Mr. X's. The defendant's probability of paternity would then
be
19 191 - = 86.36%.19 + 3 22
The fact-finder can also use this simple formula to test
different conclusions with respect to the prior odds that the
defendant or Mr. X is the father. Assume, for example, that
the mother had frequent sexual relations with Mr. X. The
fact-finder may conclude that, under the circumstances, Mr.
1
1l+-
PI
PATERNITY TESTING, supra note 5, at 86. If the numerator and denominator of this
fraction are multiplied by PI, it becomes PI
P1 +1
the formula in the text. The formula in the text is a better expression of the
probability because it is easier for judges and juries to work with.
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X is 10 times more likely to be the father than the defendant.
The defendant's probability of paternity would be
19 19
19 + 10 29
(scientists consider this figure statistically insignificant)."
Conversely, Mr. X's probability of paternity would be
10 10+10 
- 29 - 34.48%.19 + 10 29
However, if the circumstantial evidence showed the defendant
5 times more likely than Mr. X to be the father, then the
probability of his paternity would be
5 x 19 _ 955x19+1- 96 98.96%.5 x 19 + 1 96
In short, if the circumstantial evidence justifies enhancing the
prior odds of a particular person's paternity, then the effect
on the calculations is shown by merely multiplying that per-
son's index (wherever it is found in the equation) by the fact-
finder's assessment of that person's odds of paternity.
As the paternity index increases, the magnitude of the
prior odds of paternity may decrease substantially and the ac-
cused father will still score over 95%. If the accused has an
index of 200 or more, which is not uncommon, and we assume
that there are 10 Mr. X's, or one Mr. X who is ten times more
likely than the accused to have fathered the child, then the
probability of paternity is 200
= 95.23%.200 +10
If the identity of Mr. X is known and his blood may be
sampled, then, assuming he is not excluded, one may use the
same formula to compare the relative probabilities of pater-
nity of Mr. X and the defendant. Again, assuming that the
"soft" evidence indicates an equal probability of paternity,
the probability of the accused's paternity is
pid  67
PId + PIx
66. See infra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
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The probability of Mr. X's paternity is
PIx
PId + PIx
Again, if the circumstantial evidence shows that the odds of
one man's paternity is greater than the other's, then the
probability of paternity is calculated by merely multiplying
that person's index by those odds wherever the index appears
in the formula.
It is clear, then, that a fact-finder should not attempt to
use these statistics unless fully informed with respect to the
assumptions underlying the calculations-particularly the as-
sumption of intercourse and the assumption of a 50% prior
probability of paternity. It verges on the inevitable that a pa-
ternity index yielding 95% probability will be mistakenly con-
fused with a 95 % probability of intercourse or paternity. If, in
a jury trial, these assumptions are not made absolutely clear
by the experts, then the court should either instruct the jury
on the assumptions"' or seriously consider excluding the evi-
dence under California Evidence Code section 352 or the
equivalent section in another jurisdiction. Any expert who un-
derstands and candidly explains these calculations will, if
asked, undoubtedly explain the underlying assumptions.
In addition, the fact-finder should be given the paternity
index of the accused and of a random man, the probability of
the accused's paternity based on the 50% prior probability as-
sumption, and the simple formula for recalculating the
probability of paternity based on the fact-finder's own assess-
ment as to the prior odds of paternity.
In Swedish courts where there are no juries, and judges
are well informed as to the meaning of these statistics, the
evidence is presented in this manner. The need for a thorough
explanation is even more acute when jury trial is the mode of
fact-finding. Currently there is no uniformity in the way pa-
67. PATmRwry TESTNG, supra note 5, at 88.
68. In TV star Chad Everett's recent paternity trial, the trial judge suggested
that the jury decide the issue of intercourse prior to using the statistics. The jury
found for the defendant in spite of a 95% probability of paternity. San Francisco
Chronicle, Nov. 4, 1981, at 2, col. 1. The propriety of this instruction may be tested
on appeal. The L.A. Daily Journal, Jan. 5, 1982, § 2, at 1, col. 3.
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ternity probabilities are presented. For example, until re-
cently, the Irwin Memorial Blood Bank in San Francisco
presented the paternity index, while the HLA Tissue Typing
Laboratory at U.C.L.A. presents only the probability.0 9 Now
the Irwin Memorial Blood Bank presents both the paternity
index and the probability of paternity based on different as-
sumed prior probabilities of paternity. 0 Neither laboratory
reports the simple formula for melding the blood group evi-
dence with the soft evidence in the case. In addition, the
U.C.L.A. practice can be very misleading because percentages
alone do not, to the lay person, accurately reflect the differ-
ences in probabilities on which they are based. For example,
10:1, 100:1, and 1000:1 all translate into percentages over 90%
(91%, 99%, and 99.9% respectively), 7 yet there are vast dif-
ferences between these probabilities. It is also easy to forget
that the comparison is being made to a single random male,
not the entire male population.
Unless the evidence is presented in the format suggested
above,'7 the fact-finder will have no reliable way to evaluate
the statistics in light of the other evidence in the case. In
69. Sample certificates on file with the Santa Clara Law Review.
70. Letter from Dr. Herbert A. Perkins, July 21, 1982 (on file with the Santa
Clara Law Review).
71. See infra notes 64-75 and accompanying text.
72. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. Some experts use a different for-
mat for calculating the probability of paternity. See Ellman and Kaye, supra note 5,
at 1148. If P(FIE) is the probability that the accused is the father given the blood
group evidence, and P(F) is the probability that he is the father prior to discovering
the blood group evidence (i.e., the prior probability), then:
P(EIF) = 1 . In a case where the
( 1 1P I N P (F ) )
paternity index is 19, and P(F) is assumed to be 1/2, then this becomes:
P(EIF)= 1 1 1 19
- - - - .95.
18 20 20(1-)+ / - + (2x1/19) -
19 1 19 / 19 19
As can be seen, this gives the same result as the formula suggested in the text accom-
panying note 65, supra. While the above formula has the advantage of dealing only
with probabilities rather than a mixture of odds and probabilities, it has the disad-
vantage of involving more arithmetical steps which may be confusing or difficult for
jurors to manipulate. For this reason, the format suggested in the text seems
preferable.
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cases where different prior odds of paternity are indicated,
this formula will be an essential tool for synthesizing the soft
and scientific evidence. Some scientists may shrink at the no-
tion of mixing objective scientific evidence with subjective
non-scientific evidence,"3 but, unfortunately, a trial is a forum
in which society has no choice but to do the best it can in
accommodating the scientific method to the adversary system
of the courtroom. There is simply no sensible alternative.
To be sure, the fact-finder in a given case may not be able
to assign prior odds of paternity to the various participants,
but in such a case the fact-finder is hardly any worse off with
this information. The formula would at least be a useful guide
to the fact-finder when the fact-finder comes to the difficult
task of applying common sense to uncommon and complex
scientific facts. If the evidence is not presented in this or a
similar format, 7  then the court should seriously consider ex-
cluding it under its general discretion to exclude confusing
and prejudicial evidence.75
73. See supra note 54.
74. The French paternity expert Denise Salmon shows the results of the
probability calculation assuming several different prior probabilities-e.g. 10%, 50%,
and 90%. D. Salmon and C. Salmon, Blood Groups and Genetic Markers Polymor-
phism and Probability of Paternity, 20 TRANSFUSIONS 694 (1980). The Irwin Memo-
rial Blood Bank recently began reporting calculations based on assumptions of prior
probabilities ranging from 10% to 90% in increments of 10%. At least one other
California laboratory does likewise. (Sample reports on file with the Santa Clara Law
Review). These practices are variations of the "chart" or "modified chart" approaches
suggested by Ellman and Kaye, supra note 5, at 1152-53.
. It makes little sense in a civil case to assume a prior probability of more than
50% because the burden of proof is preponderance of the evidence. An assumption of
more than 50%, then, assumes that the defendant loses and merely calculates by how
much.
The propriety of the preponderance-of-evidence standard for civil paternity cases
may itself be open to question. In In re Angelia P., 28 Cal. 3d 908, 623 P.2d 198, 17
Cal. Rptr. 637 (1981), the California Supreme Court, arguing that parenting is a "fun-
damental right," held that due process requires application of the "clear and convinc-
ing evidence" standard to parental termination proceedings. In Salas v. Cortez, 24
Cal. 3d 22, 593 P.2d 226, 154 Cal. Rptr. 529 (1979), the same court, arguing that
freedom from imposition of a parent-child relationship is equally as compelling an
interest as maintaining the relationship, required appointment of counsel for accused
indigent fathers in civil paternity cases. It would seem a logical extension of these two
cases to require clear and convincing evidence to impose a parent-child relationship.
In light of blood test evidence, this would not be an unrealistic standard of proof.
75. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 403; CAL. EvID. CODE § 352 (incorporated by refer-
ence in CAL. EVID. CODE § 895). See supra note 7.
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E. Calculating the Paternity Index
Bayes' Theorem can be applied successively to each new
piece of evidence. If we call the probability ratio in Bayes'
Theorem for the first item of newly discovered evidence PI,
then the odds of the fact being true given this evidence are
PI, x O(F). This is the prior odds when the next piece of evi-
dence is discovered. Thus, the odds that the fact is true given
the second piece of evidence are PI2 x PI, x O(F). If there are
n pieces of evidence in the case, then the odds that the fact is
true given all this evidence are PI, x PI2 x PIs x . . . PIn x
O(F). This formula is correct only if the existence of each
piece of evidence is statistically independent of each other
piece of evidence.7
With few exceptions, each blood group is statistically in-
dependent of every other blood group. (The one important ex-
ception among systems used in paternity work is HLA, which
is composed of several tightly linked subsystems. Calculations
can be adjusted accordingly.") In other words, whether a per-
son is A, B, AB, or 0 will not increase or decrease the
probability of his being Kell, M, N, or MN, or any other blood
group. Moreover, the paired genes on the chromosome are sta-
tistically independent from one another. Thus, the existence
of an A gene does not increase or decrease the probability that
an A, B, or 0 gene will pair with it; and the existence of an M
gene does not increase or decrease the likelihood that an M or
N gene will pair with it.
Given the statistical independence at these two levels, it
is possible to calculate a paternity index for each blood group
tested. These indices may then be multiplied together to ar-
rive at the overall index for the accused man. The equation
becomes the product of PI, through PIn multiplied times the
prior odds of paternity. Since the prior odds of paternity are
assumed to be 1:1, the paternity index is simply the product
76. See JOINT GUIDELINES, supra note 17, at 261; PATERNITY TESTING, supra
note 5, at 85. Hummel's method of calculation, which is explained in JOINT GUIDE-
LINES, can be a bit confusing because, instead of working directly with PI, he uses the
log of 1/PI. Use of logs facilitates hand calculation because it is easier to add logs
than to multiply indices. The use of 1/PI seems a needless confusion and it is not
used in Scandinavian countries. See Valentin, Bayesian Probability of Paternity
When Mother or Putative Father are not Tested: Formulas for Manual Computa-
tion, 91 HEREDITAS 163 (1979).
77. Valentin letter, supra note 33.
[Vol. 22
PATERNITY TESTING
of the indices for each system.
In order to calculate the index for a particular system,
one must know the frequency of the particular genes giving
rise to the blood type in the relevant racial and geographic
population. Because of extensive studies, the gene frequencies
are published."8 Once the gene frequencies are known, and the
blood group of the mother, child, and father are known, the
index can be calculated. 9
The PGM system is a good example because it is a
straightforward codominant system.80 A person is either PGM
1-1, 1-2, or 2-2. If the frequency of the "1' gene is p and the
frequency of the "2" gene is q, then the frequency of a 1-1
person would be p2 (the probability of a gene being "1" is p;
the probability of finding two "1" genes is p x p = p2), the
frequency of a 1-2 person would be 2pq (i.e., pq + qp), and
the frequency of a 2-2 person would be q2. The following
chart illustrates all possible combinations:
78. The frequency may vary dramatically according to race, and usually less
dramatically according to geography. See supra notes 22 and 25. Gene frequencies are
published in A. MOURANT, A. KoPEc, K. DOMANIEWSKA-SOBCZAK, THE DISTRIBUTION OF
THE HUMAN BLOOD GROUPS AND OTHER POLYMORPHISMS (1976). This book has been
updated once, and it may continue to be updated in future years. Moreover, laborato-
ries engaged in the relatively new HLA testing are in constant contact with one an-
other sharing data on gene and haplotype frequencies.
79. It is also possible to calculate the paternity index when the mother or father
is unavailable. The formulas are fairly complex, but the technique may be critical in
heirship cases. Valentin, Bayesian Probability of Paternity When Mother or Puta-
tive Father are not Tested: Formulas for Manual Computation, 91 HEREDITAS 463
(1979).
Highly polymorphic systems, such as Rh, involve more complex equations. For-
mulae for the Rh system may be found in M. Okajima, Probability of Paternity in Rh
Blood Groups, 7 ACTA GENT. MED. ET GEMELL 321 (1958). These must be inverted
because they have been calculated as 1
PI
80. The author is grateful to Dr. Jack Valentin for suggesting this example and
checking the calculations.
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p-1 q-2
p-1 p2  pq
q-2 pq q2
Assume the following mother, child, father constellation:
Mother 1-1; Child 1-1; Alleged Father 1-1. Since the mother is
homozygous for "1", she must have given an "1" gene to the
child. The child must have received the other gene from its
father. The probability that a paternal "1" gene would be
found if the accused is the father is P(EIF) in Bayes' Theo-
rem. Since the alleged father is also homozygous for "1", he
can give only "1" genes. The probability of his transferring a
paternal "1" gene if he is the father is 100%, or 1. P(E IF), the
numerator for the ratio in Bayes' Theorem, is 1.
The denominator, P(Elnot-F), is the probability that a
random man who fathered the child would have passed a pa-
ternal "1" gene. This probability is equal to the frequency of
encountering the "1" gene in a random sperm of the relative
racial and geographic population. Since a sperm carries only
one gene of each pair, the probability simply equals the gene
frequency for "1" genes+p.
The paternity index for the PGM system in this mother,
child, father constellation is, then, 1
p
Assuming that the accused father in the same example
were 1-2, then, because there is a 50% chance of passing the
"1" and a 50% chance of passing the "2", the probability he
would pass the "1" gene if he were the father would be .5.
Therefore, the numerator of the Bayesian ratio is .5, and the
paternity index is: .5 1
p 2p
In other words, when compared to a random man, the odds
that the 1-1 man fathered the child in this mother-child com-
bination are twice those of the 1-2 man.
The following charts give the formula for calculating the
paternity index for each mother, child, father constellation in
this simple, codominant system:
[Vol. 22
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Child 1-1 Child 1-2 Child 1-2
4 1 -1 1-2 2-2 0 1-1 1-2 2-2 0 1-1 1-2 2-2
1-1 1/p /2 p 11-/2 p 1/q
1-2 I/p /2 p - 1-2/2 q 1/q 1-2 1 1 1
2-2 2-2 1/2 q 1/q 2-2 Ip 1/2 p -
To calculate the index, one simply inserts the gene frequen-
cies for the relevant racial and geographic group. (The blanks
are paternal exclusions.)"1
81. Calculating the index for a system with dominance is slightly more complex.
Assume that the system has two phenotypes, + and -. A person who tests "+" could
have the genotype + + or +-. A person who tests "-" can only have the genotype
The index in the following family constellation would be calculated as follows:
I Phenotype Genotype
Mother --
Child +
Alleged
Father + ++ or +-
*Because must have inherited a - from the mother,
therefore cannot be + +.
Because the child must have received the + gene from its father, we must first
calculate the likelihood that the accused man would pass a + gene given that he
has a "+" phenotype. This likelihood equals the probability that he would be
+ + and pass the gene, plus the probability that he would be a + - and pass the
+ gene. The frequency of + + men is p', and the frequency of +- men is 2pq
(he could be +- or -+). Therefore, the relative frequency with which a + man
passes a + sperm becomes
(P'/ 2 p/q p(p+q)
p.+2pq p(p+2q)
Since p+q = 1, this becomes 1/1+q.
The probability that a random man would pass the + gene is equal to the fre-
quency of the + gene in the population, p. Therefore, this accused father's paternity
index is: [1/1+q]/ = I/(p~pq).
The calculations are more complex when the mother, child and father all test for
the dominant gene because the probability of each possible maternal contribution
must also be calculated.
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F. Calculating the Paternity Index in HLA12
In the HLA system, A and B types (called alleles) are
linked together and passed along in packets. A person will
have two A's and two B's, but a blood test of the person can-
not show which A's are linked with which B's. If the mother,
for example, has phenotype A2, A25, B7, B18, her haplotypes
may be A2, B7/A25, B18, or A2, B18/A25, B7. If she has a
child with phenotype Al, A25, B18, BW35, the child must
have inherited the A25, B18 from the mother (since the
mother did not have Al, BW35 to give). We can, then, infer
that A25 and B18 are linked in a haplotype in both the
mother and child. Therefore, the father must have passed the
haplotype Al, BW35.
If the father does not have the antigens Al, BW35, he is
excluded as the father of this child. Assume, however, that the
father has the following antigens+Al, A28, BW35, BW51. He
cannot be excluded because he has Al, BW35.
We do not know, however, whether this man has
haplotypes Al, BW35/A28, BW51 or haplotypes A28, BW35/
Al, BW51. In the latter case, he could not, barring a 1 %
chance of recombination, 3 father the child. The first step in
calculating this man's paternity index is to calculate the
probability that his alleles are linked Al, BW35/A28, BW51.
To calculate this, the frequency of this linkage is compared
with the frequency of the A28, BW35/Al, BW51 linkage in
the population. The calculation would look like this: 8
4
Al, BW35 A28, B51
frequency 60.1"5 frequency 31.6 60.1 x 31.6 = 1899.16
(relative frequency)
A28, BW35 Al, B51
frequency 36.1 frequency 11.5 36.1 x 11.5 = 415.15
2314.31
(relative frequency)
82. See generally, PATERNITY TESTING, supra note 5.
83. In 1% or less of the cases, the HLA alleles will switch chromosomes. Thus,
an A28, BW35/A1, BW51 person could pass A28, BW51 or Al, BW35. Valentin Let-
ter, supra note 25. PATERNITY TESTING, supra note 5, at 55.
84. The author is grateful to Dr. Herbert A. Perkins, of the Irwin Memorial
Blood Bank, for supplying the following examples and checking the calculations.
85. The frequencies are expressed per 10,000. Thus, there are 60.1 Al, BW35
haplotypes per 10,000 haplotypes.
[Vol. 22
PATERNITY TESTING
This indicates that the Al, BW35/ A28, B51 haplotype will
occur in 1899.16 of the cases and the converse haplotypes in
413.15 2314.31
2314.31 of the cases. The accused man's probability of being
linked in a way to possibly father this child is: 1899.6
- .82.
2314.31
If the accused were linked Al, BW35/A28, BW51 and he
fathered a child, he would pass on the Al, BW35 haplotype in
only one-half of his matings. The probability that, if he were
the father, he would pass on the paternal haplotype found in
the child is therefore .50 x .82 = .41. The probability that a
random man would pass on the Al, BW35 haplotype is equal
to the frequency of finding that haplotype in a random sperm
of the relevant population. In this particular case, it would be
found in .00601 random sperm. The accused father's paternity
index is: .41
.061- 68.22 -- 98.55%.
.00601
If the accused man's parents are available for testing, it is
very possible that the accused man's actual haplotype config-
uration could be inferred in the same way the child's was in-
ferred in the above example. If his mother gave A28, BW51,
and his father gave Al, BW35, then the accused father would
be Al, BW35, rather than just being 82% likely to be Al,
BW35.86 Conversely, if one of his parents gave Al, BW51, and
the other gave A28, BW35, then because of the 1 % chance of
recombination, the accused would have only a /2 % chance of
passing an Al, BW35 haplotype.17 In an appropriate case jus-
86. The accused's paternity index would, then, be
.50
- 83.19 = 98.81%.
.00601
Note also that the accused's father would have a 98.81% probability of being the
father. This underscores the importance of the assumptions underlying these calcula-
tions, see supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
87. The accused's paternity index would, then, be
.005 = .83 = 45.46%, a statistically insignificant probability.
.00601
A proper calculation of the paternity index should include the possibility of re-
combination. While in most cases the small possibility of recombination makes only
an insignificant difference in the paternity index, in some cases it can make a tremen-
dous difference. If we assume a Central European population, and a child (A1 , A2 ,
1982]
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tifying the expense, this kind of further testing might be
indicated.8
An HLA case can be more complex when the paternal
and maternal haplotypes cannot be clearly determined. The
following example from an actual case demonstrates the point:
Mother A2 AW24 BW50 B40
Child A2 AW24 BW35 B40
Father A2 BW35
In this case the mother could have given either the A2, B40
(in which case the alleged father would be excluded) or the
AW24, B40 (in which case the alleged father could not be ex-
cluded). First, the probability that the mother is linked
AW24, B40 must be calculated. This is calculated in the same
manner as for the father in the first example.
The alleged father has two "blanks." This means that ei-
ther he is homozygous (i.e., the genes on both sides of the
chromosome are identical) at that locus, or he has an undis-
covered or silent allele. In the latter case if the undiscovered
or silent allele were coupled in a haplotype passed to the
child, the child should also have a blank. The father's possible
haplotype arrangements are:
A. If blanks in both an A and B locus:
1. A2, BW35/--
or
B5 , BW50), mother (A2 , A3 , B5 , B7 ) and a putative father (A1 AW 2 3 , B8 , BW50), a
calculation ignoring the possibility of recombination yields a probability of paternity
of only 9.8%. When recombination is considered, the probability jumps to 97.2%! J.
Conradt, J. Valentin, K. Hummel, & P. Ihm, An Algorithm to Evaluate HLA Results
Taking into Account Recombination Between the A and B Loci, BIOMATHEMATICAL
EVIDENCE OF PATERNITY 151, 156-57 (Hummel & Gerchow, ed. 1981).
88. If the parents were cooperative, no court order would be necessary, and, if
the information were not informative or were damaging, the test results may be pro-
tected by the work product privilege. See Sanders v. Superior Court, 34 Cal. App. 3d
270, 109 Cal. Rptr. 770 (1973); Scotsman Mfg. Co. v. Superior Court, 242 Cal. App. 2d
527, 51 Cal. Rptr. 511 (1966); Swartzman v. Superior Court, 231 Cal. App. 2d 195, 41
Cal. Rptr. 721 (1964). It is unlikely that relatives who are not parties or under the
control of parties would be ordered to take blood tests. The opposite party might,
therefore, be able successfully to argue that the work product privilege should give
way in light of the need for the information and the inability of the party to get the
substantial equivalent. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2016(b), (g) (West Supp. 1981).
Moreover, great care must be taken not to waive the privilege. Williamson v. Superior
Court, 21 Cal. 3d 829, 582 P.2d 126, 148 Cal. Rptr. 39 (1978).
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2. --BW35/A2--
B. If homozygous at A2, but blank at one B locus:
3. A2, BW35/A2,--
C. If homozygous at BW35, but blank at one A locus:
4. A2, BW35/--BW35
D. If homozygous at both the A and B locus:
5. A2, BW35/A2, BW35
In case 2, he could not be the father. In case 5 he would
have a 100% chance of passing on the A2, BW35 haplotype.
In cases 1, 3, and 4 he would have a 50% chance of passing on
the A2, BW35 haplotype. The probability that the father
could pass on A2, BW35 is one-half times the probability that
he is either 1, 3, or 4 above, plus the probability that he is 5.
The probability that he could have fathered the child is the
probability he could have passed on the A2, BW35 haplotype
multiplied by the probability that the mother is AW24, B40/
A2, BW50. This is the numerator in the probability ratio.
The denominator equals the probability that a random
man could father the child. This would equal the probability
that the mother is A2, B40/AW24, BW50 multiplied by the
probability a random sperm is AW24, BW35, plus the
probability the mother is AW24, B40/A2, BW50 multiplied by
the probability that a random sperm is A2, BW35.
In this particular case, the paternity index is 40.15 and
the probability is 91.57%. Again, a study of the HLA types of
the mother's and alleged father's parents could remove some
of the ambiguities and either raise or lower the probabilities.
For example, if the studies showed the child's mother carried
an A2, B40 haplotype or the alleged father carried the-
BW35/A2-haplotypes, then, barring the 1% chance of re-
combination, the alleged father would be excluded. On the
other hand, if the mother were shown to be A24, B40/A2,
BW50 then the denominator in the probability ratio simply
would be the frequency of the A2, BW35 haplotype.
G. Statistical Significance
At present there is disagreement in the scientific commu-
nity about the level of significance of different paternity indi-
ces. The Nordic countries presently use the following signifi-
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cance levels.89
Index=
.053 or less (prob. 5% or less)
.053 to 19 (prob. between 5%
and 95%)
19 to 100 (prob. 95% to 99%)
over 100 (prob. over 99%)
paternity improbable
paternity neither particularly
probable nor particularly
improbable
paternity rather probable
probable
The 1976 AMA-ABA Joint Guidelines, however, suggest
that significance limits proposed by Hummel, a German pa-
ternity researcher.90 These are:
Index=
5 or less (prob. 83% or less)
6 to 10 (prob. 83% to 91%)
11 to 20 (prob. 92% to 95%)
21 to 100 (prob. 96% to 99%)
101 to 200 (prob. 99% to 99.5%)
over 200 (prob. over 99.5%)
no significance
undecided
paternity likely
paternity very likely
paternity extremely likely
paternity practically proven
The Nordic guidelines are more conservative in assigning a
positive likelihood of paternity to the paternity index. While
Hummel ascribes a likelihood of paternity at index 11, the
Nordic countries do so only when the index reaches 19. Since
both agree that an index of 19 (corresponding with 95%) is
89. Valentin Article, supra note 5, at 429-30.
90. See Joint Guidelines, supra note 17, at 262; Explanation of Paternity Test
Report, Irwin Memorial Blood Bank of the San Francisco Medical Society (on file
with the Santa Clara Law Review). There are even slight differences in the way
Hummel's table is interpreted. The Joint Guidelines use the following break points:
Below 80%, 80-90%, 90-95%, 95-99%, 99.1-99.75%, and over 99.80%. The Irwin Me-
morial Blood Bank expresses the significance in terms of the indices listed in the text
accompanying this footnote. These indices yield the percentages accompanying them
in the text. As can be seen, these are slightly different from those used by the Joint
Guidelines. In PATERNITY TESTING, supra note 5, at 87, a slightly different modifica-
tion of Hummel's table is given:
Likelihood
of Paternity
practically proven
extremely likely
very likely
likely
certain hint
not useful
Paternity
Index
>399 to 1
> 95 to I
> 19 to 1
> 9tol
> 4tol
< 4tol
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Probability
of Paternity
99.8-99.9%
99.0-99.7%
95.0-98.9%
90. -94.9%
80. -89.9%
less than 80%
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significant, the better practice would be to follow this level as
the one generally accepted in the scientific community. More-
over, ninety-five percent is a commonly accepted level of sig-
nificance, 9' and it is also the one accepted by the EEOC and
courts when statistical analysis is used to show discrimination
in Title VII cases.92
The highly skewed nature of the distribution of paternity
indices of nonexcluded men also suggests the appropriateness
of the Nordic standard. One study found that of the nonex-
cluded men tested in the HLA system alone, 67% scored over
19 (prob. 95%), and 86% scored over 9 (prob. 90%). Only two
cases out of 1000 scored below 1 (prob. 50%).93
Once the accused is not excluded as the possible father of
the child, he is in a group which includes nonexcluded fathers
and nonexcluded nonfathers. The fact-finder must determine
into which of these categories the accused falls. Ironically,
nonexcluded nonfathers frequently score impressively high
probabilities. In fact, the geometric mean for the paternity in-
dex of nonexcluded nonfathers appears to be between 3.15
and 5.65 (76%-85%).94 Nonexcluded fathers also score high
indices, with the mean somewhere between 19 and 100. Since
a nonexcluded nonfather is more likely to score 85% than a
true father, such a score not only does little to differentiate
nonexcluded fathers from nonexcluded nonfathers, but it
may, if anything, be more probative of nonpaternity than
paternity.
Simply stated, the biologic father is likely to achieve a
very high index (19 or more). If he does not score an index
higher than one would expect a nonexcluded nonfather to
score, however, then we cannot say whether he is more likely
to be a nonexcluded father or a nonexcluded nonfather. Since
this conclusion is counterintuitive, a high index in the range
commonly received by nonexcluded nonfathers has a positive
tendency to mislead the fact-finder. Therefore, the "signifi-
cance" level should be kept high and indices below 19 should
91. PATERNITY TESTING, supra note 5, at 86.
92. See Braun, Statistics and the Law: Hypothesis Testing and Its Application
to Title VII Cases, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 59, 70 (1980).
93. Terasaki, supra note 5, at 552-53.
94. Valentin Article, supra note 5, at 425. Plotting the frequency with which
fathers and nonexcluded nonfathers obtained different log index values, Dr. Valentin
came out with the following curves:
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either be excluded as evidence or, if admitted, should be spon-
1
0 1 2 3 4 log L
-Distribution of the paternity index L in logarithmic scale among 1,371 one-man cases 1973-1974.
Three of the men were outside limits of graph (log L - -2.5, +4.7, and +4.9). Stippled area under fine line
contains presumed nonfathers. Log L - 0 corresponds to a probability of paternity of 50%; log L - 1.28, to 95%;
and log L - 2, to 99%.
The Irwin Memorial Blood Bank has begun a more sophisticated study. Inter-
view with Ms. Fonna Cronin, Irwin Memorial Blood Bank, April 28, 1982. 345 ac-
knowledged caucasion families were tested to see what the known father's paternity
index would be using the HLA system. The median index (i.e., there were as many
above the index as below the index) was 50 (probability 98.04%). The paternity indi-
ces ranged from .03 (probability 2.9%) to 5795 (probability 99.98%).
The same 345 mother-child combinations were then matched with 345 randomly
chosen men (who presumably, were not fathers of the children). The HLA test ex-
cluded all but 18 of these men. These 18 men would, then, be nonexcluded
nonfathers. The median paternity index for these nonexcluded nonfathers was 8
(probability 88.89%), and the range was 1.7 (probability 62.96%) to 57.3 (99.83%).
Four of these men had the most common haplotype (Al, B8), and two of them car-
ried another very common haplotype (A2, B44).
Tentative as these results are, they illustrate several important things. Nonex-
cluded nonfathers will often score impressive probabilities, particularly if translated
into percentages. One half of these 18 nonfathers scored percentages of 88.89% or
higher, and the top score was an impressive 99.83%. This is contrary to the common
assumption that a nonfather, if not excluded, should at least score a low probability.
At the same time, the median for fathers was 98.04%. While one would expect fathers
to score higher than nonfathers, these calculations are important because they illus-
trate in a rough way how much higher the score should be.
The second important point is that men with common haplotypes are more likely
to be nonexcluded than ones with rarer haplotypes. Common sense suggests this, and
this experiment bears it out. In the event that an accused father bears a common
haplotype, testing in other systems should be seriously considered.
This small group of 345 families is probably not large enough to yield firm data.
For example, the theoretical exclusion rate for HLA is about 90%, yet the tests failed
to exclude only 18 rather than 34 nonfathers. This might be some indication that the
group was not large enough.
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sored by a witness familiar enough with the statistics, compu-
tations, and literature to explain the indices' significance or
lack thereof.95
H. Beyond the Paternity Index
Recall that the paternity index equals the probability of
paternity only when the man selected is 50% likely to be the
father. Can statistics tell us anything about the correctness of
this basic assumption?
Assume that the probability is 1/100 that in a given case
a randomly chosen man would have the proper blood groups
to father the child. The mother cannot see or know the sero-
logical profile of the alleged father. If he has the blood groups
necessary to father the child, it might appear that the
probability that the mother did not choose him randomly (i.e.,
the probability that she knew he was the father) would be 1-1/
100 or 99%. This, however, would be incorrect. The
probability that a single choice was made non-randomly can-
not be calculated from the probability that it could be made
randomly. If it were otherwise, then no race track or gambling
house would ever have to pay a player who wins a long-shot
bet. The improbability of the player choosing the correct re-
sult would be almost conclusive evidence that the player
cheated. This is intuitively obvious, because many extremely
rare occurrences happen randomly every day.
If, however, many selections are made and the results de-
viate from the distribution one would expect from random se-
lection, then statistics can tell us the probability that the se-
lections are not being made randomly."" If, for example, the
gambling house knows that the odds in roulette favor the
house, but the results over a substantial series of plays favor
the gamblers, then the house may properly infer that the
game is, for some reason, not random.
In the paternity context, there are tens of thousands of
mothers picking men as the fathers of their children. Obvi-
95. In a recent case the court gave little weight to 98.95% probability of pater-
nity, in part because the testimonial sponsor was a medical technologist. "She did not
know the extent or nature of the other evidence to be introduced at trial and she was
not in a position to weigh the evidence and make a mathematical determination of
the probability of paternity." Alanda V., a minor v. Alfredo V., 125 Cal. App. 3d 98,
101, 177 Cal. Rptr. 839, 840 (1981).
96. Braun, supra note 92, at 68-74.
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ously, some of these mothers, even if picking randomly, would
choose men with the appropriate blood groups. If, out of every
100 mothers, 99 choose men who could not be the father and
only one chose a man who could be the father, there would be
no reason to conelude that the selection of a nonexcluded man
was anything other than a random guess. On the other hand,
if 99 mothers choose men who could have fathered the child,
and only one chose an impossible father, then one could at
least say that mothers, in general, know who the father is and
are not choosing randomly.
It is possible to draw the curve of the expected distribu-
tion of paternity indices if men were being chosen randomly
and compare it with the actual distribution of paternity indi-
ces of men accused by mothers. The government licensed lab-
oratory in Sweden has completed a preliminary study along
these lines. The laboratory, which had investigated about
75,000 paternity cases, 7 focused its study on 3,913 of those
cases. The number of blood systems tested gave a probability
of exclusion for nonfathers of 86.6%. The actual rate of exclu-
sion in the tested cases was only 30-35%. This result is not
surprising to the extent that it shows that by-and-large
mothers pick the right man. The 30-35% exclusion included
exclusions in both one-man cases and cases where more than
one man was accused and tested. In one-man cases (those in
which the mother claimed that only one man could possibly
be the father), it is perhaps surprising that the man was ex-
cluded in 22.6% of the cases.98 This exclusion often leads to a
refreshed memory on the part of the mother as to other possi-
ble fathers.
The Swedish study estimated the frequency of accused
nonfathers by comparing the observed and theoretical exclu-
sion rates. In one-man cases it was 26.1%. Thus, women in
general accused the right man in approximately 73.9% of the
one-man cases. Paradoxically, if the mother initially had
named several possible fathers, the true father was less likely
to be among them. At least in one-man cases, these results
97. Valentin Article, supra note 5.
98. In a similar study done by Dr. Paul Terasaki, 25% of the cases tested re-
sulted in exclusions. He does not state whether these were all "one man" cases. Ter-
asaki, supra note 5, at 552. Tests done by others (sometimes using a less impressive
array of genetic markers) have excluded from 16% to 26.5%. PATERNITY TESTING,
supra note 5, at xi-xii.
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strongly suggest that the mothers are more than 50% likely to
be correct. Thus, the Bayesian prior odds of paternity could
be adjusted upwards.
Although a fact-finder may intuitively arrive at a similar
conclusion, there are some serious obstacles to the introduc-
tion of this sort of statistical evidence. Many scientists gener-
ally consider polygraph evidence to be 95% accurate, but the
courts, with a few exceptions, do not consider it sufficiently
reliable to be admitted absent a stipulation.9 Scientists base
this estimate on the test's ability to detect falsehood in the
large group of people who have been tested. Similarly, the pa-
ternity statistics are based on inferences about the truth and
falsity of accusations made by a large group of people. If poly-
graph results are inadmissible even though they are based on
more or less involuntary responses to prevarication and may
be able to detect falsehood with a 95% degree of accuracy, a
statistical "polygraph," which generally tells us only that
mothers are correct in 70-75% of the cases, should likewise be
excluded. Moreover, the veracity of mothers may vary from
place to place and time to time. In fact, the very existence of
paternity testing should, if it becomes common knowledge, af-
fect the general level of veracity.
In addition, there have not been enough studies here or
abroad to justify generalizations about the veracity of
mothers. At best, the current studies are tentative, suggesting
that further study may be interesting and helpful.
The existing studies are not helpful in litigation for an-
other reason: The wrong group was studied. After the pater-
nity tests are completed the majority of accused men who
score high indices admit paternity. Less than one-fourth of
the Swedish cases required further legal action.100 One might
suspect that a higher percentage of nonfathers would be found
99. People v. Adams, 53 Cal. App. 3d 109, 125 Cal. Rptr. 518 (1975); People v.
Trujillo, 67 Cal. App. 3d 547, 136 Cal. Rptr. 672 (1977) (admissible if stipulation);
Tarlow, Admissibility of Polygraph Evidence in 1975, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 917, 946-48,
953-56 (1975). This judicial attitude may be changing. See Witherspoon v. Superior
Court, 133 Cal. App. 3d 24, 183 Cal. Rptr. 615 (1982)(criminal defendant entitled to
evidentiary hearing affording opportunity to prove polygraph generally accepted as
accurate in the field in which it belongs).
100. Valentin Article, supra note 5, at 421. This would undoubtedly be true in
the United States because many men, knowing full well the possibility of their pater-
nity, really only want some assurance that the child is actually theirs. Even King
Leontes finally relented. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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among the group of men who persistently claim nonparentage
throughout litigation. This smaller group must form the basis
for generally assessing the credibility of mothers.
Courts have used similar statistical analysis in other con-
texts. For example, courts have admitted statistical analysis in
discrimination cases to show that a pattern, such as hiring, is
not one which can be explained by random or nonbiased selec-
tion.1' 1 Racial or sexual motivation may be inferred if the pat-
tern deviates significantly from that which has occurred with
respect to another race or sex. There are significant differ-
ences, however, between using statistics to infer the state of
mind of a defendant in a discrimination case and using them
to infer knowledge of the mother in a paternity case. The
plaintiff in a discrimination case offers statistics against the
party who engaged in the conduct giving rise to the statistic.
The statistics are based on conduct of either the party or
others for whom the party may be charged. It is not unfair to
place the burden on the defendant to explain the conduct of
these people. Therefore, the conduct giving rise to the statistic
operates very much like an admission of a party opponent. By
contrast, statistics in paternity cases share none of these char-
acteristics. The mother is often a witness rather than a
party,102 and the statistics are not based on her conduct, but
on conduct of other mothers. The alleged father cannot ex-
plain that conduct, nor could the mother if the statistics were
offered against her.
If, in the future, there are enough studies on the proper
group, and mothers consistently identify fathers in contested
cases well above 50% of the time, the legislature might con-
sider enacting a presumption shifting the burden of produc-
tion, or possibly the burden of proof, to defendants in pater-
nity cases.' 08 In any event, these sorts of statistics are much
101. Braun, supra note 92.
102. Most actions are brought by the District Attorney seeking reimbursement
of welfare benefits. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 11350, 11350.1 (West 1966 & Supp.
1982). See In re Marriage of Hight, 67 Cal. App. 3d 498, 136 Cal. Rptr. 731 (1977)
(mother only nominal party to action brought by District Attorney).
103. E.g., Connecticut law provides that if the mother "continues constant in
her accusation," then the burden of proof on the question shifts to the accused father.
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-160 (1981); Kelsaw v. Green, 6 CONN. CIR. CT. 516, 519-20,
276 A.2d 909, 911-912 (1971); Mosher v. Bennett, 108 Conn. 671, 674, 144 A. 297, 298
(1929). The United States Supreme Court discusses the Connecticut rule in Little v.
Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 9-12 (1981).
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more useful in adopting overall policies towards paternity
cases than they are in resolving any particular case.
V. CONCLUSION
If, in the California Supreme Court's words, mathematics
is a sorcerer in our society, the bench and bar must learn
about the forensic use of mathematics in order to avoid the
fate of the hapless sorcerer's apprentice. In the paternity area,
courts must familiarize themselves with paternity statistics in
order to exercise wisely their discretion under California Evi-
dence Code section 352 in weighing the probative value and
prejudicial impact of this evidence. Attorneys must also be-
come sufficiently versed in the area to guide fact-finders and
judges in the proper use of paternity statistics.
Paternity statistics are particularly vulnerable to criticism
because the calculations are based on the hidden assumption
that the accused father is as likely as not to have fathered the
child. If the paternity calculations are reported in the format
currently used in Sweden, the fact-finder should be able to
test this assumption against the actual evidence in the case
and arrive at an accurate understanding of how the other evi-
dence in the case affects the overall probability of paternity.
Paternity statistics are no more reliable than the data on
which they are based. Reputable and experienced laboratories
will rarely make a typing error, but some of the data about
HLA haplotype frequencies is still very sketchy. Actual obser-
vation of some haplotypes is rare, so their frequency is based
on the product of the frequency of the A or B alleles. When
the actual haplotype is observed, its frequency may be signifi-
cantly different from this product. Testing of the mother's
and alleged father's parents can be very helpful in resolving
some ambiguities.
The "probability of exclusion" is a troublesome statistic
because it invites the inference that the probability of exclu-
sion equals the probability of paternity for a non-excluded
man. This is incorrect and, more importantly, misleading.
Thus, the probability of exclusion should be excluded as evi-
dence in favor of the probability of paternity.
The significance of a "high" probability of paternity is
difficult to evaluate. It is clear that nonexcluded nonfathers
can score comparatively high probabilities of paternity (since
most nonfathers are excluded, the rest must of necessity "fit"
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reasonably well). In one study, as many nonexcluded
nonfathers scored over 88% as scored under 88%. On the av-
erage, fathers have higher probabilities of paternity than
nonexcluded nonfathers (in the same study, the mean for fa-
thers was 98.04% ),104 so a paternity index must be rather high
before it really differentiates the nonexcluded nonfathers from
the (obviously nonexcluded) fathers. There is no general
agreement in the scientific community that a probability be-
low 95% has significance. Scientists generally agree that a
probability greater than 95% (Paternity Index 19) is signifi-
cant, so significance should be attached only to those
probabilities exceeding 95%. Courts should weigh this factor
in exercising their discretion when the probability is below
95%, and counsel should take care to insure that the fact-
finder is aware of the importance of this significance level.
In the future it may be possible to bring statistical analy-
sis to bear on the question of the credibility of the mother. It
is unlikely, however, that the statistics would be suitable as a
forensic tool. They might, however, be useful to legislators
when setting policy in this troublesome area of family law.
104. See supra note 94.
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